Soviet policy toward Japan during World War II

The Soviet Union fought the war against Japan in Manchuria, Korea, Sakhalin, and the Kurils from August 9 through September 5, 1945. 1 It is important to incorporate the Far Eastern theater into the general description of the Soviet role in World War II for three reasons.First, during the war Stalin always considered the Far East one of the important factors in his comprehensive strategy in the war.Second, the war that the Soviet Union fought in Asia also contributes to the discussion on whether Stalin and Soviet policy during World War II were motivated by the realist approach or by ideology.Third, the end of the Pacific War marked the beginning of the nuclear age, and therefore, how Stalin reacted to the American use of the atomic bomb had important implications for the subsequent development of the relationship between nuclear weapons and the Cold War. 2 2 This paper attempts to examine the objectives of Soviet policy in the war against Japan.I argue that the primary goals of the Soviet Union from the Yalta Conference to the entry into the war were to enter the war so that it could obtain the war trophies promised at Yalta, and further that once the Soviet Union managed to enter the war, the Soviets were determined to physically occupy these territories.By skillfully combining diplomacy and military operations, Stalin managed to achieve his goals.This is not to say that Stalin pursued his policy without any mistakes.In fact, he misjudged the U.S. fears of the Soviet role in the Pacific War, and he was completely outwitted by Truman about the Potsdam Proclamation.Nevertheless, he was aided by Japan's reliance on Soviet neutrality.In the end, the Soviet entry into the war played a more crucial role in Japan's decision to surrender than the U.S. atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

3 Stalin achieved his goals in the war against Japan, but in the long run, the Soviet entry into the war and the occupation of the Kurils instilled profound enmity among the Japanese against the Soviet Union, making it exceedingly difficult for the Soviet Union to achieve rapprochement with Japan.Soviet policy toward Japan during World War II Cahiers du monde russe, 52/2-3 | 2011Once the first imminent threat for survival of the Soviet Union receded in December, 1941, Stalin revealed his intention to join the war against Japan in his conversations with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, although he rejected Eden's request to join the war immediately.The Soviet Union was bound by the Neutrality Pact, Stalin explained, and as long as the nation had to devote all its energy to fight the Germans, it could not wage war on two fronts. 7 After the victory of the battle of Stalingrad, however, Stalin began seriously making preparations for the war against Japan.He ordered the NKVD to construct a new railway line to connect Komsomolsk-na-Amure to Sovetskaia Gavan´ on the Pacific Coast.At the Foreign Ministers Conference in Moscow and at the Teheran Conference in October 1943, he pledged to enter the war against Japan after the capitulation of Germany, a promise that was made to extract Allied agreement to open a second front in Europe.He intended to wage war against Japan for geopolitical interests, regardless of the Allied position, but he managed to sell this demand as if it was his concession to the Allies.At the conference, he made it clear that he would make known in due course his "desiderata" for Soviet entry into the Pacific War. 8 Meanwhile, Stalin requested from his foreign policy experts their position papers on Soviet policy toward Japan.Both the Deputy Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Ivan Maiskii, in January and the Ambassador to Tokyo, Iakov Malik, in June, 1944, in separate memoranda advocated obtaining Soviet borders that would assure the future security of the Soviet Union, specifically insisting on regaining southern Sakhalin and the Kurils.

9Both justified these demands in terms of Soviet security, not on the basis of historical legitimacy or any ideological principle.But Maiskii and Malik assumed that these demands should be met by the Allies in a peace conference after the war without the Soviet Union participating in the war.