A Study on the Strategic Conflict between Mao Zedong and Stalin in the Early Period of Chinese People’s Volunteer Army’s entered the Korea War

On October 25, 1950, with the beginning of the first Campaign, a strategic conflict began between Stalin and Mao Zedong. Stalin tried to make China’s participation public early and prolong the conflict between China and the United States(US). The early entry of the Soviet Air Force on November 1 and the expansion of operations over North Korea on November 6, were decisive opportunities for the US to acknowledge China’s participation.

At the same time, Stalin took the initiative in proposing the formation of the Sino-North Korean Joint Command to Mao and Kim Il-sung to tie Mao’s hands and feet to the Korean War. Mao attempted to end the Korean War through negotiations with the US by using the victories in the first and second Campaign, and to solve the problem of China’s United Nations(UN) representation and Taiwan in one spell. On the contrary, Stalin, on the one hand, insisted that China had no authority and obligation to negotiate with the UN on behalf of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army(CPVA), and on the other hand, advised Mao not to present a bargaining chip to the US first, clarifying his opposition to resolving the Korean War through negotiations.

This became an important factor in Mao’s rejection of the UN’s ceasefire proposal that satisfied China’s demands in early January 1951. In addition, the military lethargy shown by the UN forces in the third Campaign and the large amount of Soviet weapons that began to be supplied to the CPVA in January 1951, also influenced Mao’s decision to choose military means.