Expanding the Toolbox: Coercion and Vote-Selling at Vote-Casting Revisited

Abstract Coercion and vote-buying are challenging and multi-faceted threats that prevent people from expressing their will freely. Even though there are known techniques to resist or partially mitigate coercion and vote-buying, we explicitly demonstrate that they generally underestimate the power of malicious actors by not accounting for current technological tools that could support coercion and vote-selling. In this paper, we give several examples of how a coercer can force voters to comply with his demands or how voters can prove how they voted.

To do so, we use tools like blockchains, delay encryption, privacy-preserving smart contracts, or trusted hardware. Since some of the successful coercion attacks occur on voting schemes that were supposed/claimed/proven to be coercion-resistant or receipt-free, the main conclusion of this work is that the coercion models should be re-evaluated, and new definitions of coercion and receipt-freeness are necessary. We propose such new definitions as part of this paper and investigate their implications.