Reliable and Decentralized Certificate Revocation via DNS: The Case for RevDNS

Taejoong Chung, Dave Levin, Protick Bhowmick

ACM SIGCOMM Conference (SIGCOMM) · 2025 · 인용 2

The Online Certificate Status Protocol's long slide—after 25 years of soft-fail rules, privacy leakage, and shaky infrastructure—exposes a deeper failure in web-PKI revocation. Certificate Authorities increasingly route OCSP traffic through CDNs for speed, yet this recentralizes trust: our measurements show Akamai serves 62 percent of all revocation responses, creating single points of failure and betraying PKI's decentralized ideals.

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