Harvest-Now, Decrypt-Later: A Temporal Cybersecurity Risk in the Quantum Transition

Telecommunication infrastructures rely on cryptographic protocols designed for long-term confidentiality, yet data exchanged today faces future exposure when adversaries acquire quantum or large-scale computational capabilities. This harvest-now, decrypt-later (HNDL) threat transforms persistent communication records into time-dependent vulnerabilities. We model HNDL as a temporal cybersecurity risk, formalizing the adversarial process of deferred decryption and quantifying its impact across sectors with varying confidentiality requirements.

Our framework evaluates how delayed post-quantum cryptography (PQC) migration amplifies exposure and how hybrid key exchange and forward-secure mechanisms mitigate it. Results show that high-retention sectors such as satellite and health networks face exposure windows extending decades under delayed PQC adoption, while hybrid and forward-secure approaches reduce this risk horizon by over two-thirds. We demonstrate that temporal exposure is a measurable function of data longevity and migration readiness, introducing a network-centric model linking quantum vulnerability to communication performance and governance.

Our findings underscore the urgent need for crypto-agile infrastructures that maintain confidentiality as a continuous assurance process throughout the quantum transition.