Conceptual rigor in behavioral public policy: ethics and epistemology under nudge saturation

Abstract Behavioral public policy (BPP) has grown significantly since the rise of nudge, yet it remains conceptually fragile. This article argues that some of its epistemological and ethical challenges arise from persistent vagueness and terminological inflation. Terms like “nudges,” “boosts,” “sludges,” “budges,” and variants such as “nudge-plus” or “self-nudges” are often used inconsistently, blurring important distinctions in mechanism, normative intent, and policy impact.

Against this backdrop, the article examines examples of the conceptual misuse that pervades BPP literature and argues that clarity should not be a mere academic preference but an ethical, political, and epistemological necessity. Concepts, the article contends, are epistemic tools: they organize knowledge, enable ethical evaluation, and structure scientific inquiry. As in other disciplines, where frameworks like Mendeleev’s periodic table or Linnaeus’s classification of species helped organize, predict, and discover phenomena, conceptual clarity in BPP would enable more coherent epistemic theorization and ethically sound policy design.

To illustrate this, the article offers a novel working ethical taxonomy of behavioral interventions evaluated across six dimensions: mechanism, epistemic foundation, locus of harm, primary normative logic, transparency/consent, and temporality. This framework is presented as one possible innovative model to demonstrate how disciplined conceptualization can support epistemic rigor and normative accountability. Ultimately, the article issues a call to action: for scholars, practitioners, and institutions to enforce a more rigorous conceptual infrastructure.

Without such rigor, BPP risks devolving into rhetorical confusion; with it, the field can advance as a scientifically grounded and ethically responsible approach to governance.