Reassessing the Disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, 1985–1991

Mark Kramer, The Fate of the Soviet Bloc's Military Alliance: Reform, Adaption, and Collapse of the Warsaw Pact, 1985–1991. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2025. 75 pp. $77.00 hardcover, $25.00 eBook.Based on extensive archival research in many repositories in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, Mark Kramer's concise book recounts the fate of the Warsaw Pact states and the alliance itself after Mikhail Gorbachev's ascent to the highest post in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1985.

The book is insightful in numerous ways. First, it is an innovative contribution to a better understanding of the political and military reforms in the Warsaw Pact during the final years of the Cold War. Second, it sheds valuable light on the attempts to adapt the military alliance to Gorbachev's new thinking in foreign policy, especially in terms of “reasonable defense sufficiency” and “non-offensive defense” (p.

12). Third, Kramer depicts these adaptation processes against the backdrop of the bold changes in Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe under Gorbachev.Initially, as Kramer points out, there were only a few signs of Gorbachev's reforms. During his first two years in office, Gorbachev emphasized the need for tighter political control within the Warsaw Pact. “Newly available archival evidence contravenes the speculation by a few Western analysts that Gorbachev decided at an early stage to leave the East European states to their own devices,” Kramer notes (p.

15). Gorbachev's caution and his adherence to traditional Soviet foreign policy prescriptions were evident at the CPSU's 27th Party Congress in February 1986 when he placed priority on economic reforms and other domestic issues and emphasized the need for the East European Communist countries to have “a considerate and respectful attitude to each other's experience and put such experience to practical use” (p. 17).Kramer argues that although Gorbachev's statements at Soviet party meetings and Warsaw Pact consultative gatherings initially adumbrated continuity, “some seemingly modest steps that went largely unnoticed laid the groundwork for more sweeping changes in the years ahead” (p.

19). Among these changes were the appointment of Vadim Medvedev as the CPSU Secretary responsible for intra-bloc affairs and the designation of Georgii Shakhnazarov as his first deputy. Later on, Shakhnazarov became one of the key architects in the reform of the Warsaw Pact (p.

19). These personnel changes and other modest reforms, including the use of new rhetoric, signaled “an uneasy combination of ‘old thinking’ and ‘new thinking,’” as Kramer writes (p. 22).

Among other things, the Warsaw Pact allies obtained greater leeway to discuss the negative aspects of the USSR's military presence in Eastern Europe, such as noise caused by low-flying aircraft in Hungary and associated problems (p. 20).Kramer's analysis illuminates how the competition between new and old approaches became evident during internal debates on the adoption of a new military doctrine for the Warsaw Pact in May 1987. Foreign Minister Edvard Shevardnadze and Defense Minister Sergei Sokolov clashed about the question of “what exactly such a doctrine would mean in practice and what the state of the NATO-Warsaw Pact military balance was” (p.

22). Gorbachev endorsed Shevardnadze's points, arguing that the Soviet Union had considerable military advantages in several weapons categories and could thus afford certain reductions in weaponry (p. 22).

Kramer points out that Gorbachev's overall aim was to reduce the share of military expenditure in the budget and to facilitate renewed arms control negotiations with the United States (p. 24). To this end, Gorbachev started to seek advice from civilian experts at the Soviet Foreign Ministry and the CPSU's International Department.

As Kramer emphasizes, Gorbachev “increasingly sensed that he would have to move away from the traditional Soviet style of force planning, which in the past had always been the exclusive preserve of high-ranking military officers on the Soviet General Staff, who were wont to operate on the basis of worst-case scenarios and inflated threat assessments” (p. 24).In May 1987, the official adoption of the Warsaw Pact's new military doctrine signaled a turn toward a defensive concept and a reduction in military force levels over the long term based on the “overriding importance” of Gorbachev's economic reform agenda (p. 25).

Despite these changes and a “renunciation of preemptive options” (p. 25), Gorbachev was uncertain how far he would seek to reconfigure political and military relations within the Warsaw Pact. As a case in point, he emphasized the continued relevance of the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine (the official rationale for the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968) in November 1987, arguing that “we know what damage can be caused by weakening the international principle in the mutual relations of socialist states, by deviating from the principles of mutual benefit and mutual assistance, and by neglecting to heed the common interests of socialism in action on the world scene” (p.

28).Not until 1988 did Gorbachev shift toward comprehensive military reforms, including his endorsement of unilateral troop reductions and a restructuring of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe. After the conclusion of the landmark Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in December 1987, Gorbachev's advisers became more willing to challenge Soviet military commanders on basic questions of force posture and military doctrine. Shakhnazarov sharply challenged the premises and findings of a report by Marshall Viktor Kulikov, the commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact, who argued for an increase in airborne forces and a strengthening of chemical warfare forces (p.

30). Heeding Shakhnazarov's concerns, Gorbachev instructed Defense Minister Dmitrii Yazov order Kulikov to redraft the report. Subsequently, at a meeting of Warsaw Pact Defense Ministers, Gorbachev introduced a new definition of military security. “Instead of a balance of forces, we need a balance of interests.

Instead of military parity, we need parity of security,” (p. 30) he argued.Given the impasse in conventional arms control negotiations with the United States, Gorbachev's embrace of new thinking induced him to announce unilateral troop reductions in Eastern Europe, including 50,0000 troops, 5,300 tanks, and 24 tactical nuclear weapons within two years (p. 31).

Gorbachev's abandonment of the Brezhnev Doctrine in early 1989 was initially kept secret, but it paved the way for tectonic shifts. The Soviet Union was no longer willing to use force to retain its empire. Kramer notes that “in effect, Gorbachev persuaded the members of the Politburo and the Defense Council to join him in deciding well in advance that the Soviet Union would not take military action in Eastern Europe, even if the Communist governments there collapsed” (pp.

37–38). To that end, Gorbachev secretly annulled the Soviet Union's long-standing commitment to provide military assistance to the Warsaw Pact states “in extreme circumstances” (p. 38).Kramer's book depicts the adaptation process in the Soviet bureaucracy at the time, starting with a memorandum from one of Gorbachev's top aides, Vadim Zagladin, and culminating in specific policy recommendations in a ten-page memorandum signed by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, Defense Minister Yazov, and State Foreign Economic Commission Chairman Vladimir Kamentsev entailing bold changes in Soviet foreign policy.

The Soviet Union would no longer use force to cement Communist control in Eastern Europe. Their report stated that “‘internal situations in the [Warsaw Pact] countries . . . do not fall into the category’ of by the Warsaw Treaty by the defense the Soviet Union with Warsaw Pact states do not to take of in with (p. the Soviet Union did not when one Communist after in the fall of The Warsaw Pact alliance was in when in and the for its after the Soviet had on in the in Kramer's book is an contribution to the on the of the Warsaw Pact. and from on his an in key and points, a on the reform and final of the Warsaw Pact. Kramer in a several at the of the Soviet Union's and domestic policy.

The book is for a including and the from but not Kramer's an of the on the Warsaw Pact and the of archival after the of the Cold numerous on the of the Soviet Union in December with the of Mikhail Gorbachev as General Secretary of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1985. The final of the Warsaw Pact, the of the Soviet Union, but not on the basis of as archival evidence as in the new book by Mark to his European relations and relations were during these and this had for the Warsaw argues against the by Western that Gorbachev the Warsaw Pact from the the new Soviet out to reform and the 1987, his policy with to the East European states was the one Gorbachev greater leeway on especially the other he to the Brezhnev Doctrine (the official for the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in to the Gorbachev priority to Soviet domestic economic and to military the Warsaw Pact's new military doctrine of May 1987, in emphasized defensive this new Gorbachev on from civilian advisers who to Soviet military commanders were to the new doctrine and to their leeway for action was by an the in May by an from in a the way from to a to in by Soviet defense caused military officers and in the Soviet Gorbachev top Ministry of Defense personnel and his over the as Kramer Soviet military commanders about the new and to toward a defensive and 1988 Gorbachev in a more at a meeting of the Warsaw Pact defense he that the of the alliance on military on and that a balance in Europe was his he the defensive of the Warsaw Pact. After the had this Gorbachev to unilateral which he in his the United General in December To the between his policy and the new the Eastern European states, Gorbachev the principle of of for Warsaw Pact what that would the of the book is the Soviet internal from to at the of which the CPSU Politburo and the Soviet Defense Council secretly out military in East European countries in case of internal only was Gorbachev willing to changes in Eastern Europe, he even his to the of Communist which had for the Warsaw Pact. for a he not to that the alliance was he would not have to preserve it as a political after the of Kramer the political changes in 1989 and the alliance of its (p. and East European countries in the Treaty had even more to from the Soviet Union after the of December in the of Foreign Minister the by Soviet military and state forces in and in for the Warsaw Pact were when on the foreign of and Hungary a that their countries would out of the alliance the Soviet Union to a meeting that would its military was the of the of the Pact which was in on Kramer a but book about the final years of the Warsaw Pact. can be to and a Kramer valuable new into the of a seemingly well of the Warsaw Pact, as the Warsaw Treaty was was one of that know but about which the is Mark Kramer points out in his on the of Eastern Europe and the of the to military including the fate of the Warsaw (p. key to the of the Pact. is not even for in the of that Mikhail Gorbachev's two of what to the Warsaw Pact, when and Kramer a for the of that Kramer not is the of in the of the Pact. an by on how the to Soviet over the military of notes Soviet that the of in the Treaty for the would mean a shift in the military balance in Europe (p. in this that the of the as East from the Warsaw Pact to as a for other Pact to As a in the would the to that Gorbachev's in the of the from the Warsaw Pact and its in as a on the fate of the would not have Gorbachev's in Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe.

Kramer is in the of Gorbachev's Kramer points out that in 1986 and 1987, when Gorbachev to the of the East European states, he these with of the Brezhnev (p. Gorbachev's landmark in 1987, that the Eastern European members of the Warsaw Pact to balance their domestic with of the international socialist to the Brezhnev as Kramer Gorbachev's were with of for East European until in 1989 Gorbachev a of the Brezhnev Doctrine (pp. argues that Gorbachev's abandonment of the Brezhnev Doctrine did not until early Gorbachev that from the of his in meetings with Warsaw Pact in and he emphasized the principle of in the affairs of the other Communist other he “we were the so-called Brezhnev from in the and Eastern Europe caused Gorbachev to his of within the Soviet Gorbachev no such when states the Warsaw Pact. the of to the so-called he stated is to its own way of to of its its and its and in at from the fall of it was to know Gorbachev's for could be at As and Hungary with reforms, of Eastern Europe the of a Soviet to the reforms. The on this was to by an who had the on how to its time, he the reforms had far to be even if Soviet were of a to do by the in of 1989 to its with an for East to leave the and the of as was by Hungary into and to from there to the The was to such but as the of East to the decided at the of that would no longer to East from the The to the of when of East to the of the and the Soviet to the to his East to the to the 1989 at first did not to the of threat to the that the had years The in its to and of the of at the in East were of the out only did the but it was over the and early fall of 1989 by a of by the East reforms.

The a in early during a by Gorbachev to East out for Gorbachev to about reform in the As a of the continued the Politburo of the Party on to the from The new in the by of modest at the to Soviet on the in East emphasized to a Soviet State at the Soviet in East was as a that the were not by the and Gorbachev's The was that if and his had Soviet advice and had a process of reform the East be he is the of Soviet to preserve the Communist the at reform by the East to be and The and of the and the for by in and East for To to on the the of United States, and the Soviet a the negotiations were Their was the of within that had for the Warsaw key of the Treaty on the with to was the that a state would be to its own an of of other of the The Western and the such to this that it be in its own in the The one of the basic principles of the of the on and in Europe as the a between Gorbachev and at a May in the two that the have leeway to this with each it would in a of the out to be the Soviet and the of for the with the Warsaw Pact, it became that this was a The of the in the from the a for a between the two by the final Communist of the The the could for would be a the that the Soviet had first in there were who for the of a such a would have on to and his Union as well as to the United the of the USSR's of the Soviet at the negotiations a to preserve and the military that the had on in the of of the military would have the a of control over the and it at first that and of which were uneasy about the of be to the Soviet the of the and into and the Soviet Union was to the advisers of the Western allies had been on the and into the but were instructed to a but comprehensive and became of the with a first to a sweeping of and on and and a of a that the would have over its internal and as the in the for the Soviet of a on the for a The first was a of the was a in As by and in their Secretary of State at an early stage Gorbachev and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze would an which at to nuclear over a that would no need to do if by nuclear this was not a but the as the toward and Soviet that their of a had recounts how in to a of a in if the of could be in this of the Soviet was the Warsaw Pact Foreign meeting in in and Czechoslovakia no to for a far from the these East European from a by the in to that could be would be question for the Western (the the Western became how to to it for the Soviet Union to was not a to The could not be and on would mean that only of a would be the of a of the on what of military forces could be on former and in during and after the of Soviet forces from that the of that into the on a of to the of to to the and the Warsaw Pact. These the by of the use of weapons of commitment by the Soviet Union to its from by commitment by the not to defense forces into its alliance on East Soviet were there continued presence of the of the Western until the Soviet its on the of foreign on East the Soviet of the of the of the term in the to the of on that were into after of the Soviet that were only with conventional weapons and for conventional of these was to defense to the of but military on former East to that the but it was to what the to was in the Western over what were as to the Soviet of the Western political over the on foreign military on former after the Soviet the on this were to a considerable to the of Soviet forces from a which as the key to years the an from the State of European this of the that a military could not be at the in The was that even that of military was by the of by into Eastern Europe is for its from the official in the on this was it at the at the Western is of by Vladimir and other political that in this were during the The only were the negotiations that did the of Gorbachev and his top aides, as kept the of their with Secretary of State and other Western on the of into after the time, Soviet by the of were about within East European countries about high-ranking Western were East European from the of Soviet have that the East European of their was by the Kramer's its by how East European thinking on the in the of the East European states the that their into was (p. The of the Warsaw Pact on was the to these the of the East away from the Warsaw Pact have Gorbachev the of force to in Eastern Europe by the Brezhnev the states of Eastern Europe not to reform their but to by to the of the from the Warsaw Pact and its into as of the Gorbachev East European thinking about their own to the have been the The of of the Communist in Eastern Europe, the of the of the Warsaw Pact, the of the and the of into Eastern is as a of Gorbachev's of the of Kramer's book is his to that the on the of key Kramer a and of the of the Warsaw Pact, as be from the of what Soviet can about the Cold War.

The of the Warsaw Pact, which in been by the of the of Communist Eastern Europe in 1989 and the of the itself at the of is to the of that forces over Europe for of the Cold for what it can about the of that and for questions it about the of Kramer's and Collapse of the Warsaw Pact, its on during the of Mikhail Gorbachev as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Kramer that in 1989 that Soviet many of had in the Soviet case to of the changes that 1989 to the Eastern European a of Gorbachev's toward in the of Soviet military to control of the Soviet military out of to in of of and the of its 1987, when the of the Soviet General Staff, Marshall Sergei for the first the CPSU Politburo a on Soviet military one of the members of the Politburo who was a of Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, to the statements on the Pact, of his for for in the alliance and about such as Kramer the in Gorbachev's to the of military reform to the presence of new and more advisers such as Georgii Shakhnazarov and and especially to the when the his in May 1987, which Gorbachev with a of Soviet military a December 1988 to the United General Gorbachev foreign and domestic by reductions in the of Soviet military international arms November the Forces in Europe and reductions on key categories of conventional weapons in Europe, and in the Treaty which of Soviet and nuclear weapons by the final years of Gorbachev's the of a Pact invasion of Western Europe had and the Pact its had a the one it was a military defensive but in by its military and internal toward action against the the other the Pact of Eastern Europe, in the of the The invasion was by the but military from and from East political for the invasion was by what to be in the the as in an in the CPSU's in which that although countries be to their own of their damage socialism in their the interests of other socialist November Brezhnev on this of in a at the Congress of the United Party (the Communist that internal and forces to socialism to turn a socialist to this a common and a of socialist with many Soviet and in was of the CPSU in the of Soviet in the of that in his case were by his to at State University with a of the reform in Soviet who not to take the from internal to Gorbachev kept his at the largely to the early of his as CPSU General Secretary he was on the Brezhnev he was about the in an to he endorsed the invasion to the (pp. during a 1988 to he to move away from the Brezhnev Doctrine by a for of and socialist countries to for the of their own (p. be the Soviet Union did not need for that to in Eastern Europe, as the of East in and of Hungary in as 1989 it out that the Soviet Union under Gorbachev was willing to sweeping the way to the of Communist the time, Gorbachev's and to in the Kramer in his a to this that Eastern Europe, Gorbachev had persuaded his on the Soviet Politburo to that internal to the Communist in Warsaw Pact states were not for Soviet internal process to this in the early of 1989 when one of Gorbachev's Vadim Zagladin, him that could the to provide to Pact members in an action that could even what we have political new Gorbachev instructed to a of the and in 1989 the Soviet a memorandum from Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, Defense Minister Dmitrii Yazov, and Foreign Economic Commission Vladimir Kamentsev arguing that only foreign by the to under of the an and that even in the Soviet Union would not be to military other to the it is that well 1989 Soviet had about military in other Pact especially the Communist General under Soviet introduced to the the when Soviet to to him if forces to do the the CPSU Politburo to him an on the that he in his if he he had a Soviet internal about the a until by Kramer in and but who in was a of the CPSU have the when he decided not to take action against after its in the 1989 and other Soviet initially that it would be to the Warsaw Pact after Communist had in Eastern Europe. in and early this The first was the of on terms to the including in the Treaty and an for Soviet to leave the of the former East by The was the Soviet Union's use of force against governments in the in with at the that Gorbachev be in his commitment to of these the the of the new Eastern European governments to the Pact as as of the of the Warsaw Pact under from the East European governments is the the Soviet Union had on in Eastern Europe for years the itself the of the were to the by in Europe at the the more years the of what was in even was the by that the state of the Soviet after years of Gorbachev's at economic there was no way the new in could the military the Soviet Union had during the Cold as a key its to be a European The for at the was by the seemingly of and governments and Eastern Europe, a on when the countries in the former Warsaw Pact in and the European of forces in and and in former and the to the we and what to do about it is well the of Kramer's but understanding the of to be an of