A Study on the Crisis Management in the Processof Silla’s Downfall: Focusing on Changes in the Elements of National Power(DIME)

The Bukak Historical Society, Tai-jin Kim

The Bukak History Academy · 2026

This study analyzes the 170-year decline of the Silla Kingdom—spanning from King Hyegong (the 36th monarch), when late-stage systemic symptoms first surfaced, to King Gyeongsun (the 56th monarch)—to evaluate crisis management within the process of its downfall. To this end, historical facts are interpreted and analyzed through the lens of modern crisis management theory, utilizing the four-stage framework (Prevention-Preparedness-Response- Recovery) and the elements of national power (DIME: Diplomacy, Information, Military, Economy). While conventional perspectives on the downfalls of Baekje and Goguryeo view the outbreak of war as the “Response Stage,” this study sets the “Response Stage” for Silla as the critical juncture when the unified state fractured due to the founding of Later Baekje and Later Goguryeo.

The analysis reveals that the “Prevention Stage” regarding Silla's downfall encompasses the period from the political instability of King Hyegong’s reign to the outbreak of Kim Heon-chang’s rebellion during King Heondeok’s reign. Notably, the implementation of the Dokseo Sampumgwa (civil service examination) in 788 under King Wonseong aimed to transform informational capabilities by reinforcing civilian-centered governance ; however, it generated a strategic paradox that weakened the military elite and degraded military command capabilities. Consequently, during the “Preparedness Stage,” this led to diminished control over the Guseodang (the central military forces) and facilitated the rise of the Sipjeong (the regional military forces), such as Jang Bogo’s maritime forces.

Combined with widespread tax evasion in the economic sector, this trend accelerated the dissolution of the state’s monopoly on legitimate violence. The founding of Later Baekje and Later Goguryeo marked the transition to the “Response Stage,” during which the central military completely failed to control nationwide peasant rebellions. Confronted with Gyeon Hwon’s invasions, Silla exhibited a phenomenon of “heteronomous security,” depending heavily on reinforcements from Goryeo rather than its own armed forces.

In the final “Recovery Stage,” King Gyeongsun’s submission (Gwibu) to Goryeo can be reinterpreted not as a defeat by military force, but as a strategic regime transition intended to preserve ethno-national and cultural assets, serving as the ultimate resort of crisis management. In conclusion, the downfall of Silla presents a textbook example of a total failure in crisis management caused by the systemic degradation and organic functional loss of the elements of national power (DIME) over 170 years, rather than a short-term military defeat. This historical precedent offers crucial implications for modern national security, demonstrating that maintaining the integrity of public military power and securing the professionalism of the military command structure are imperative for state survival.

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