Asymmetric Interest Rate Pass-Through from Monetary Policy: The Role of Bank Regulation

Sebastian Roelands

SSRN Electronic Journal · 2012 · 인용 12

When the monetary policy rate increases, banks increase loan rates fairly quickly and by roughly the same amount. However, when the policy rate falls, bank loan rates adjust more slowly and not completely. I develop a model with which I show that this asymmetry in interest rate pass-through can be explained by the presence of capital and liquidity requirements imposed on banks by regulators.

If the capital or liquidity constraints are binding, the shadow values of capital and liquidity are positive, which results in higher bank loan rates relative to the monetary policy rate. When the central bank lowers its policy rate, the critical values at which the constraints become binding are lowered, effectively tightening the regulatory requirements. This makes it more likely that banks become constrained, and hence reduce pass-through.

Empirical evidence from United States bank holding companies over 2001Q1-2012Q1 corroborates the model predictions that (i) more banks are capital constrained during falling rate periods than rising rate periods; (ii) constrained banks adjust loan rates less relative to the federal funds rate, and (iii) constrained banks increase loan rates more after a drop in their capital ratios, relative to unconstrained banks.

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