One Vietnam War Should Be Enough and Other Reflections on Diplomatic History and the Making of Foreign Policy

“I happen to be among those who believe that history has lessons for those who will read.” Thomas A. Bailey, who served in 1968 as the first president of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, made this declaration in the preface to his classic book, Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace. Writing in 1944 as U.S. policymakers were planning how to preserve international security after World War II, the eminent Stanford historian argued that the Paris Conference of 1919 certainly illustrated what policies the nation's leaders should avoid.

A master of colorful prose, Bailey put his advice to the decision makers this way: “Every generation of apes begins where the previous generations began, because apes can hand down no record of their experience. Man leaves a record; but how much better is he than the apes if he does not study it and heed its warnings?”1 It has been thirty years since the end of the Vietnam War and sixty years since the end of World War II and the beginning of the Vietnam War. A vast historical literature on the origins, course, and outcomes of both wars now exists at a time when once again U.S. forces are deployed abroad in hostile action.

The U.S. war in Iraq against Saddam Hussein was not a precise replay of the war in Vietnam against Ho Chi Minh any more than World War II and Adolph Hitler replicated entirely World War I and Kaiser Wilhelm II. How our knowledge and interpretation of diplomatic history is applied or not applied in foreign policymaking—how historical experience conveyed through scholarly discourse informs and shapes policy doctrines—is a persistent issue in these cases in which conflicting interests and differing ideologies have led to war.2 How does historical scholarship on U.S. foreign relations relate to policy-making in the present? Diplomatic historians are not policymakers (unfortunately or fortunately as the case may be), and we are not primarily contemporary policy analysts.

In the same preface in which Bailey employed his apes analogy, he self-effacingly reminded himself and us not to be “too pontifical” in our lectures and seminars. He recounted a note he found left behind by a student after a class in which she had written to the student next to her: “Too bad Bailey couldn't have been there to tell them how to do it.” In our classes and writings we are interpreters of past policies. We were not there to tell them how to do it, but we try to make the past speak to the present in a meaningful way.3 Our purpose is to communicate what we know about the past from the systematic study of archival sources.

As intellectuals we understand that knowledge is a cultural and ideological construction, and as researchers we often lack full access to records due to security classification of pertinent documents. To the extent that we can “know” the past in a practical sense, however, we give context, perspective, and meaning to what is occurring in the present. Because “facts” are often incomplete or contested and leave room for subjective interpretation based upon ideology or partisanship, the meaning of past events will always be debatable.

Historians seldom agree on definitive explanations. In his insightful analysis of the Boxer experience in China, Paul Cohen explained the elusiveness inherent in historical study as “the tension between the history that people make, which is in some sense fixed, and the histories that people write and use, which seems forever changing.”4 For those of us whose professional mission is to reconstruct and translate in a disciplined way what people have made in the past, we must not ignore that there is power and significance in what people “know” because they were there (experience) or “know” because they believe (myth), which is for them truth. With this caution in mind, however, there is a large volume of scholarship on certain subjects that provides a consensus and gives if not to historical The or interpretation of the course, and lessons of the Vietnam War is interpretation as that the U.S. in and the decision to war in Vietnam as and in by American The historians of this as and their analysis in the that U.S. foreign policy for years after World War II. there are among the on of the and there is as was in The of this the that after World War II as a to a and in that or to U.S. in the and of of the of in as the and the among U.S. leaders of about a War consensus that the among the had the power and to a international that U.S. security interests were and that was the to led to U.S. in Vietnam in to Vietnam from power the The analysis that the was not in that the of the to the was to the of and that of American there were The of this that the leaders of Vietnam their and from and they were for and that were what the to be to its The the and for the U.S. war in Vietnam and that it was a of and a of the of history and these historians as a is the that they give to a analysis of the of the Vietnam and to how those a about the of the war and its in Because historical study begins some of and these the scholarly For of this I will this of historians as in to is literature on the of history that gives these as by and meaning in the of will not that the will to those historians who analysis of to of and international The will to those interpreters of the past who make and of their to international the and in scholarly there are differing of the of the Vietnam War and of the that war and in it for of these are a or as a the was to access to and and of or analysis in from a of it begins the that the in the and was a and that its as in some that the was but was and about the history of Vietnam and the extent to which the the of that To the American war in Vietnam was that the in a of its and a to and A that U.S. leaders had no for but that they were not more analysis that American because not that they had and their power if they In of and of policy have a of of the and the of the American war in The is the of and that the of Vietnam War A of however, their not on the in Vietnam but the this a of but its in of the War consensus that the for the the that the of to was a the the of the of and that the policy in was for a in was for a Vietnam in has has a way of to be more and than the Vietnam Because the the and of U.S. policy in Vietnam at the they that that the of a in Vietnam of was to the that American To these the American as has the the of the in Vietnam as and the American as To the was not the war but it, and they their to how the have the of the of these have in of the of the was his book, and his lectures at the War a that a to the of was to the in Vietnam if the American had a he that a of U.S. forces to Vietnam to and from the of American about the for have the of Vietnam to and from is the he gives to the of the war between Vietnam and was in Vietnam in when the of the of He in that “the forces that the war in of the the forces that not of the but were the forces of the U.S. that the Vietnam war was by from the is the end of the the on the war Vietnam had been a as the but by of the of Vietnam at on the forces in the end to their The war in Vietnam that the was not a case of by the against the In when the to the Conference the of Vietnam international of its of the The in not the and of and the American in to the to that it The after the of to the of must be if the against is to be In the of the the was war on Vietnam in the of as that the at hand was to a where that “the in the Vietnam War was and its in and both and and to forces the the of the war as against Vietnam in that the decision to the of was and that the previous years of U.S. in the had been historians do not agree that was the of a by as who give for his of that was and is often by that “the not or its as and that of against Vietnam was for U.S. in however, the who that the war was for the as these try to a that the was to the Vietnam War and to as has try to have the of both of the historical of the who believe that the was on to in as and are that the of American and forces to the war or a more have to for the of the that this was a war but a that the U.S. should have of to security for the and to give the in the In their U.S. about in and that not the but the as much as the they for or a to the that the American in the war was a in its as as its in this will be to its that the war was or because for the is and historians to a meaningful to their scholarly analysis should both the of the that the of and the that the to the policymakers in to the of the has and The among historians has the interpretation among who now make or security any of the of the American in Vietnam or of the there and to what they as in the way the war was In a the in at the of the was he was in of the Vietnam War.

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the As for has about the Vietnam the to that and in what in Iraq the has as “the its The to is that in what was a it at the of a and a The in Iraq are not the and the are not the but the American and the of the and of the of As has we from the history of Vietnam it should be that there are and people who and the and in the of the and that in based upon the Vietnam of American will have and there will be that and a or more and a the of this may be but his and that of in is that history can and should be for or the of historical on the of to of are not in the history of American and after World War Woodrow Wilson the that war is of to He the that the power of was a and to the he in to a of but a of In what has the classic of international Wilson to war against in must be made for have no to are but of the of the of the of American forces to the and about the no for of his of in Wilson “Every that in the that she is due to the not that he to but that he to the may be to a but they for the of foreign As put it in declaration of to that the to the of the and of the in the the and both their lessons from his power and international security through the of and that U.S. interests were at the made leaders to international relations the beginning of the and the to the and The that had the international at the and were to to the of The of international security made the of the or no The was that it and interests in and that both the and of World War II. the World War II after the at to American of that of “the forces of and or the for to and war the of the American The end of the history had not and the of the the of the tension interests and ideologies in the of left to the of power as the to The to U.S. and security after was the of and the of its To and the of the the first of policy end of of in a that “the way to the we have found from is to of the as that made this declaration the of U.S. the extent that the and the of the in their in forces and that a forces be or we will and can on the in any as they The of war in in the of policymakers the of this of from a of a however, in the lessons As a in the and is that not when they are they are not to it when they are now on a which may make them that is the of they have and are the and in their and are to the those of does not and power does not of and cultural The and power of the and of that power through and not the in in the the of the from its on The to and the of to the in American in of what historian “the but was a from its In in it that from or its as Vietnam the to the which after the of had the and interests of the The of the in much of and was a for and in and It was how the of on the of Ho Chi Minh of The American and war in Vietnam that there are to the of power as of The had a power in the between the and the by the and the of the the the of In the American was the of not and the to on U.S. power The of and some to the American war but American in whose security the to be in from the 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believe and what he he to It had to do is often for not to but his in that is or at the Vietnam War was a and experience for American who their or in a cases in the for and who by what they had and and for American whose and that of the they led were to Paris to the the had his our as his of put it, that the president had a that U.S. forces to the in contemporary the to the Foreign in to the by which the of Vietnam has to give his that the have to that the that we that we have made a has to that and these are his first to a a more than years after the U.S. left the that the had there for to the In a at on the and the that the war was He them that the should because its be by a war that is as as is The of the war among had In the the of a for of in to the had on between and The not have the of the but it was the of a for the now end of U.S. in and that the policy of the to its a by and that the have American In the was and a that made its more than upon U.S. and a policy of as has it, and at the time and in their on for of has to the present. In in the that there is historical that the have the that of A which that was by some of the same and in his that much to as the of in in the analysis Vietnam its the Vietnam there was a of the that World War I and World War II. was of the lessons by scholarly study of the and discourse was by The to the course, and outcomes of that is to what power can and and through and to precise U.S. interests abroad after the to the A after the Vietnam War and the end of the War to the Iraq War. to the to and not to about for the of the who as had to the meaning of Vietnam for As a that leaders had about the and of the but once in he from of his and to the U.S. war some he a of American in that more than the for World War II, the was for Vietnam and the and that American had of on the and not the the president to by to the of after the War to the that had the As analysis of of the war has the way for declaration that the American purpose in Vietnam was U.S. had for in a where was in in He as to the that the American had the war by to have it in It as U.S. of and Iraq in for to that the Vietnam that the by the Vietnam experience to large U.S. this in his on the of diplomatic relations that the war once he that us us to the of the history of the Vietnam War or the the the war and for what purpose and to histories that to or the of the In the end of the the of the in a of that the lessons of the case not be made that the American in Vietnam had or to the of the in the of the which the Vietnam for In a that had in the a of that Woodrow had been had their Wilson in argued that of American power in of served U.S. and in The that ideology was the power of of these however, that should be not as a a of some but as a of contemporary the power of for American policy to which often as the of any to for the American for the for analysis In to and in the that for a foreign policy to be and it be or the of the or the of a is not in the of but the in to in War of and The War of the he is of our or the of to the in our and of the of our and are to American and to American It is not in the of the and security of the American people to these of to of a of as as The as the is how to to these In the the was as or that and based upon and lack of for the people them the of their was to for the and of the to it was not or or war that the but its It was of the and who that he first make the his The the the the to his The by and its the his In the however, as the Vietnam War was to its end and U.S. policy the was in of and a as the or was beginning to as and were in the and as and were the The lessons from the events of the as the of the and the were that the its of the forces that Vietnam had and and through these to any the the to put some of their in but for them the end of the War at the of the was the in their that the should be the and should its and to In the of were by Paul and in the the to its the in the to the nation's As a they the War the War The should should its and should not of the end of the Vietnam War to the their was the of American It was this policy and its to the president for after the on and on on was on is about the and it for A nation's foreign policy must to security for its its How to as a is It was of by a but a in a by the of the to the cultural and The not the of to U.S. that the or the in of the and to the and of the The of was a but it was not in a had the to on the but not to or the as a The however, as it in the Vietnam in how its leaders the and to In his to the on the of war on will make no between the who these and those who In the of the this to be in but in the of it a the In the that it that there were the and that the was to them if his after the some we may be the We are has that the are of of American what has often been this American historical as a the of U.S. power the of its In the at the we it, the American will not for our but for Our nation's has always been than our nation's We as we always for a that We will the against from and we will the by and on this is and are some between the of the of the the of power after World War II, and the of the of by a of if not to or a to the because the or were to to the of to about and to to as of that do not their interests or may their interests or How the to this World War World War II, and the Vietnam War the was their in the power of American and they make and precise of security and be and by the and to the the persistent of this in the history of U.S. foreign has argued for the since and have In the case of the made a of and about the of the to U.S. American leaders to what be to the of a and in Vietnam and to the The in Vietnam a to in and to the that foreign in the people of from to as they the years that the U.S. was had Ho Chi there is more than and to the and of the people as at the end of are between the and the in history and but the in the of international to the The of U.S. policy in that the between the and the a The was of a of that have the and its The issue of how much and was however, on The was of the of that of the the because of of and and which had The Vietnam experience of caution in the about in In when made a to the American Vietnam as a of and but those to be relations not in The of U.S. policy in Vietnam to a to American interests was U.S. to to the people had some but not and to for the were in as the its the foreign policy of any the is the of its interests in the international and it is not the of the of are the of the history of U.S. foreign relations for the policies of the in Iraq and is a for of to the It is now that there were no of in Iraq of what was and that Saddam was not a of any more than Ho Chi Minh was a of Saddam not he but now Iraq is to of Ho was of and his and was in relations them because of U.S. to his for Iraq have to be and to be The must to international and must to in the American in access to and and to the people of the on not The is not as to the as it was at the end of World War II.

The of the the of U.S. on and to U.S. to the at the end of World War II when U.S. and power were and to the of U.S. in the War. The Iraq War put U.S. to on of a that American and the the of the Vietnam is and In however, the is a among to its that have to or be the of and which has to that can be by American the war that the was not in in Iraq as it had in the of in Iraq the and from the Vietnam more of the past was the in which the found that how to to the American in a much more war than it the of Iraq and the to and The U.S. decision to a war in Vietnam and to that war for as as it was primarily by to the of U.S. power and purpose both and The decision for historical in Vietnam time it that the vast and power of the and the that American leaders to had in the and cultural of there is historical to be from the American experience in Vietnam it is the for U.S. leaders to U.S. interests in what are often contested American policy should be from analysis of the and to the by and the of American and on a will its and in that what U.S. and no how or can Historians of American foreign relations have this in of The of U.S. policymakers in the to the lessons of history in a American war in For a a of historical Vietnam War should be