Rediscovering history—new light on the Unknown War; Korea: The peninsular origins of the war; The origins of The Korean War: Volume 2, the roaring of the cataract; A substitute for victory: The politics of peacemaking at The Korean Armistice talks
Callum A. MacDonald
Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars · 1992 · 인용 2
The traditional Western historiography of the Korean War represented a dominant consensus that defined the conflict as a clear-cut case of communist aggression. Writing in 1964, David Rees echoed President Harry S Truman in assigning responsibility for the North Korean attack to international communism directed from Moscow. In this version, Truman avoided the fatal mistake committed by Chamberlain at Munich.
Rejecting appeasement, the United States and its allies invoked collective security through the United Nations and fought a limited war to prevent a global war at a later stage. According to Rees, U.S. intervention in Korea “was the greatest and noblest act of recent American history,” saving South Korea from “totalitarian conquest” and buying time for the West to rearm. As Jon Halliday has emphasized, this approach not only dismissed the conflicting claims of the other side but also involved “a double elimination: of Korean Communism and of the Korean revolutionary movement, on the one hand, and of the whole history, culture and society of Korea as a nation” on the other.
In this historiography Koreans were practically invisible except when Kim Il Sung attacked the South in June 1950 and when Syngman Rhee tried to sabotage the armistice in June 1953.