The Constitutional Courts of Austria and Czechoslovakia as the first institutional model of constitutional justice in Europe

O.O. Lohoiko

Uzhhorod National University Herald Series Law · 2026 · 인용 1

The article is devoted to a comprehensive study of the origins and formation of the European model of constitutional justice, which emerged in the early twentieth century amid profound political and legal transformations following the First World War. The main focus is placed on the analysis of the institutional design of constitutional review through the example of the Constitutional Court of Austria, established in 1920, and the Constitutional Court of Czechoslovakia, founded in 1921, as the first specialized bodies of constitutional jurisdiction in Europe. It is demonstrated that their establishment was a response to the need to ensure the supremacy of the constitution, the stability of the legal order, and the limitation of legislative power in democratic states of a new type.

The article examines the historical, political-legal, and theoretical foundations of Hans Kelsen’s concept of the “negative legislator,” which substantiated the possibility and necessity of a separate judicial body empowered to remove unconstitutional normative acts from the legal system without interfering in the sphere of positive lawmaking. It is argued that this concept laid the foundation for centralized constitutional review, which fundamentally differs from the decentralized American model and determined the distinctive features of European constitutionalism throughout the twentieth century. The evolution of theoretical approaches to understanding the role of the constitutional court as a guarantor of constitutional stability and the balance of powers is also explored.

The institutional characteristics of the Austrian and Czechoslovak models of constitutional justice are analyzed, including the procedures for forming the courts, their jurisdiction, the range of entitled applicants, the legal consequences of their decisions, and their place within the system of state authorities. Particular attention is paid to assessing the effectiveness of these models during the interwar period, as well as their influence on the development of the general European doctrine of constitutional review, which was later borrowed and adapted by many countries of continental Europe. Special emphasis is placed on the reception of early European models of constitutional justice in Ukraine.

The article explores the process of formation and evolution of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, traces its ideological and institutional links with the Kelsenian model, and analyzes the introduction of the constitutional complaint as an instrument for strengthening the human-rights function of constitutional review. It is shown that expanding individual access to constitutional justice represents a logical stage in the development of the European model under contemporary conditions.

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