“Henry, . . . Winning an Election Is Terribly Important”: Partisan Politics in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations

The premise of my presidential address, and now this published version of the talk, is that domestic partisan politics, the struggle for power at home, has played, and no doubt continues to play, a substantial role in the making and direction of American foreign policy. This is not a “single-theory-to-explain-everything” approach, as Simpsons creator Matt Groening once classified one of the nine types of college teacher.1 Rather it is a plea for recognizing the ongoing importance of politics in our work and perhaps acknowledging that more traditional political explanations may explain more about American foreign relations than some of the more recent and trendier undertakings in our field. To begin, let me bring in two American presidents who chose, for different reasons, to record their conversations.

This is a type of evidence we are never likely to have again, but it does provide a rather extraordinary and candid look at how presidents talked about foreign policy and perhaps how they conducted foreign policy. In August 1972, President Richard Nixon discussed the current situation in South Vietnam with his National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger. This conversation occurs shortly after the Democratic Convention has nominated George McGovern as its candidate for the presidency, on a platform calling for immediate withdrawal from South Vietnam in return for the release of American prisoners-of-war.

Nixon is pondering his negotiating options in South Vietnam, but his mind is clearly on the election and, despite his already substantial lead in the polls, he seems anything but certain of victory. August 3, 1972 Nixon: Let's be perfectly cold-blooded about it. If you look at it from the standpoint of our game with the Soviets and the Chinese, from the standpoint of running this country, I think we could take, in my view, almost anything, frankly, that we can force on Thieu.

Almost anything. I just come down to that. You know what I mean?

Because I have a feeling we would not be doing, like I feel about the Israeli, I feel that in the long run we're probably not doing them an in—uh … a disfavor due to the fact that I feel that the North Vietnamese are so badly hurt that the South Vietnamese are probably gonna do fairly well. Nixon: Also due to the fact—because I look at the tide of history out there, South Vietnam probably is never gonna survive anyway. I'm just being perfectly candid—I— Kissinger: In the pull-out area— Nixon: [unclear] There's got to be—if we can get certain guarantees so that they aren't … as you know, looking at the foreign policy process, though, I mean, you've got to be—we also have to realize, Henry, that winning an election is terribly important.

Nixon: It's terribly important this year, but can we have a viable foreign policy if a year from now or two years from now, North Vietnam gobbles up South Vietnam? That's the real question. Kissinger: If a year or two years from now North Vietnam gobbles up South Vietnam, we can have a viable foreign policy if it looks as if it's the result of South Vietnamese incompetence.

If we now sell out in such a way that, say in a three- to four-month period, we have pushed President Thieu over the brink—we ourselves—I think, there is going to be—even the Chinese won't like that. I mean they'll pay verbal—verbally, they'll like it— Nixon: But it'll worry them. Kissinger: But it will worry everybody.

And domestically in the long run it won't help us all that much because our opponents will say we should've done it three years ago. Nixon: I know. Kissinger: So we've got to find some formula that holds the thing together a year or two, after which—after a year, Mr.

President, Vietnam will be a backwater. If we settle it, say, this October, by January 74 no one will give a damn.2 Nixon and Kissinger's geopolitical realism and their embrace of the triangular diplomacy “game” come as no surprise to any historian familiar with this era. Rather, it is the explicit connection between future events in South Vietnam and both Nixon's reelection prospects and subsequent political effectiveness that is startling in its candor and cynicism.

To some extent Nixon believed he was acting just like his opponents would if they were in his position. Nixon believed that Lyndon Johnson's bombing halt in October 1968 had been designed to defeat him, and he tried to make sure that the South Vietnamese recognized this.3 This tape seems to demonstrate clearly the “decent interval” that Nixon and Kissinger sought between the American withdrawal and the final collapse—or “gobbling up”—of South Vietnam.4 There is a clear recognition of the electoral implications of such a rapid collapse of South Vietnam. It comes as no surprise that Nixon's predecessor also weighed the political consequences of his foreign policy actions.

Lyndon Johnson taped many of his telephone conversations and started this taping as soon as he became president after John Kennedy's assassination. In December 1963, in office for less than a month, Johnson called a longtime protégé and friend, Congressman Albert Thomas, a conservative Texas Democrat who was the Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Defense. This committee had just passed a bill, which included a clause sponsored by Illinois Congressman Paul Findley, a Richard Nixon supporter, which required the president to certify if he waived congressional restrictions and allowed wheat sales to the Soviet Union.

The Johnson tapes have revealed a president prone to a variety of moods—jovial and expansive, direct and business-like, even whining and complaining. In this tape Johnson is very angry, so much so that the Miller Center places a cautionary warning that the language is not suitable for children. That may be an overreaction, but Johnson gets his point across.

December 20, 1963 LBJ: I don't want to debate it with you, my friend. I love you. But you know goddamn well that when I ask them not to make me notify them publicly so it wouldn't be in the papers … Albert Thomas: Well … LBJ: You know I know what I'm doing.

Thomas: Frankly I— LBJ: You know, and we screwed it up. This damn fool [Hubert] Humphrey put that paragraph on. Thomas: That's right— LBJ: I told [Carl] Albert to get it off, cut it off.

Thomas: I think it's your partners over there on the Senate side. Now, old Otto played ball. He told me he was going to do his damnedest to take it out.

Have you got the language in front of you? LBJ: Yes, got it in front of And it to be in It's just a Thomas: or in connection with the … LBJ: That's Thomas: when the President that such guarantees would be in the LBJ: That's all Thomas: LBJ: after Thomas: I know, but your language LBJ: I want to to that I screwed a You screwed one but you don't want to it. Thomas: I I LBJ: you know what I'm That it come to you, Thomas: It going LBJ: don't you think I'm a Thomas: Now, now, now, But I don't think it's going to you a LBJ: It It just that I'm when Nixon's running That's all it Thomas: he going to because he going to … he going to get two or LBJ: You and I are You politics, and I I'm you that we're with the up there Thomas: I'm on your side.

LBJ: all You just don't a because you know goddamn well it to because I know Thomas: the with it in LBJ: you've with it, but you've been with it not a Democratic President has to that he a that it's in his to with it's not when running for Now, you know that, don't and to all the of this but the point is Johnson's that the Democratic for electoral reasons, could not be in a of to and his that the would to them that this is a clear that Johnson the of the debate and the of that the their power in which Johnson's of the for and partisan political of even the from a were with his and played a role in his foreign policy are two presidents and two of candid about partisan politics and as they foreign policy this a of the of the that will have for three our of the importance of domestic Johnson and Nixon in their on domestic is this a of the tapes a the of foreign policy the the that diplomacy and making are two one does not want to the almost by their very office for and the power to their how they of it is not to the more in their are not likely to domestic politics when they are foreign policy to one of our perhaps the of a as a is more than in this when I was to the of the of American all the that were and of I that one of the that had been in the but was from the was on by It to me as it does now, that the history of American foreign relations and domestic politics was a like the of a the work in the of the of domestic politics on foreign policy has been so and to in the to a recent and in the and are to at the American have in or in their papers that they were about domestic politics when they It would be to do to the as you know, a to the by after to an was a of the of foreign policy. as many have even the of domestic politics played an in such as the recognition of and many of the from the to the negotiating on of The of domestic politics is a in any to explain the in American foreign and domestic politics is likely to lead to a of the as it But it is not to the of domestic to the of President once the of domestic politics in foreign policy making on the to the of and the about it but it's on the were never to be make it clear that at years presidents about it. But such taped conversations can even now and after to many of Lyndon Johnson's conversations and about in Vietnam, with his about what would if he were the president to a had told me I was on a in a Vietnamese that I was for a just to a The of about an October surprise in the of 1968 and much to the about foreign policy with domestic electoral In a different about the of the or on policy in the have and of acknowledging the of domestic politics and on of a foreign policy to is by some as an of and the of of of the Because are to partisan political in foreign they have to the game of policy. have a to feel that if they a domestic or electoral for a foreign they have that it in and with this the the after the in which an American president started a to from a political at But I think have been to this as well. historian has that many the in the making of foreign policy as they were not at and and as he it, is is that domestic politics so down in that if it even it on the at To put it I think many of us are a like in in the to find domestic politics in the foreign policy we look at history have us of such a of the role of domestic politics in American foreign policy when I a on the history of American foreign I tried to a I to the of domestic for power on To some extent this is the with the of the of foreign policy and its to over the of by the even the of the had not been is a The an for to as the of recent Democratic to the to force withdrawal from But congressional of the on the was one of Henry Kissinger's policy policy was also in the of the American political not by the and it an to the by the and the of in at this as a I the to give my was the way that in and the were domestically by the of the The less as a of the American and more as a partisan political to the election of in The partisan and the the to which to the with at the of the of to a the was more than a of between the of this the of the a that the of this and both because of partisan struggle between the and also because of an struggle the which pushed President to and an negotiating that to his and we do not have tapes from this but I to a after Paul in the John with winning an election is important this The that with the as one of the important of American diplomacy also has its in domestic that the who this of American policy were by than the the was John to his required any of with the on to a with any in the In a with some that the there was no real of by the in the and that they could with the from a political has not it in domestic politics in the making of one of the and of the American the is in on foreign the of domestic and foreign seems a of the of is how important the of of was as the to the in his that is the Henry after the election of and political like and all the American is not an in the history of to but the politics of that and the out of domestic that both that in the of also in the of and the domestic over in the of the domestic and foreign The with that the on from in his like Henry who that lead to a Democratic in the and to the of many of us of his to take the as a one to the of the as to an to a seems in of American from the he of the shortly after the had the to different of a one that called for the and one that the result of the this version of an was that The in also domestic political designed to about with the designed for at the Convention in American in both be to any domestic politics, and partisan political the of both and both in their to and their of the reelection that their in the out of despite their of the of a fact that in to the importance of partisan politics in the The debate over the of at the of foreign and domestic politics on so many and the and as with the almost of together his domestic political negotiating with embrace of the for the of when it was to the shortly the and his for The result was that for the of that would result in policy the years of the This very and of the of foreign relations history me that many of the I had in the had their in It also me to look at a of political with relations to how they with this of partisan domestic politics and foreign policy. with its on as the and such acting that to power not much for this The of relations who with the more in their on the of domestic politics and in foreign policy. the of in the of foreign and domestic policy in important the that I is one with the rather of political one of the of that was my in the political to this from his role as a of the the that are more and do not political its from The is on the premise that want to in in both and but with the of for a like the it is the that to off. to this that of will their foreign with an their political at the of the its foreign policy will be in by the of on the political for the The has been in the work of political in what he a that be as a In the a would out options that his or options by the they would in domestic done the could from what of the that with his of the The that was that a would a policy that was in the as long as it not his of in This me as us to the real of political and the of foreign policy. with is that it seems to a clear between an and and a to on to the of In as the National has the very of has been a of three in American and as he it, there comes a of when the of an and the political of the is revealed in the and that have different of the but his work can also be as recognizing that different in the in the and in the this as a of the with his of a viable political and in In my recent work I have a of with two presidents who that they in but who for of a political In Lyndon Johnson and I that Johnson was a much more of the North in because he many of the he in the Senate to the have already Johnson's about how the to the on they had from in the In a recent of Johnson for a for about his domestic to that his domestic political Johnson's to the in the he in the chose, a debate but even in the of the importance of domestic political I that I also the in my that down domestic political this President for his withdrawal from of his for the of the American for the which believed In the of the tapes the of Johnson clear his of the connection between his domestic political and Vietnam. He told a after his not to run that he not have to his in Vietnam and to He on to say that I don't think any or Democrat can think I have anything to Richard of his electoral defeat were him, after the in the Nixon's to taping in with the the president had that year to a the August to the and the between the of and the the of that such an important of the political and have and their for the an important point in the as was an of Nixon's that of a in for his presidential as Nixon put it, the screwed and he was not going to let it work a of the presidential tapes for the August and Nixon's with political of any he would he to John who was in the politics of the and Nixon's be a in the domestic And we in to the cut our out In with a more Nixon that he would on his politics was would be the to know what the this is all Nixon told of of two and I'm going to have to on you … as to what the But Nixon the between now and the election in there be one And that is not the of the in the it it the fact that in foreign policy we've done that, or the the thing is that we have to the that the president of the at long after years with and is … looking after The Nixon it clear in the the are we and I'm going to say some of that are running the a of a of and we're to it as well as we And that frankly, this thing to the Nixon's on his domestic political situation was not he a very of as clear from the published on the between Henry Kissinger and Soviet In December after the Nixon had the the Soviets about presidential who would to the and with Soviet for the of to all this for their political from and in his to he told the of the but clearly of the it would be all the more to in that Nixon's could be fairly important for the current of the and that Nixon would have to take to our in how the was in as to he was by and the of the But he by that is important that the President to the fact that we can a role in the 1972 presidential election if he our or The Soviets were rather in how they but when Nixon out they of he had Kissinger that President to that very on to that the president was when he that the of the conversation was and any by the Soviet to the such a way as to all this the domestic political was not He to his that is that the President at even a of and in his to and in his in this the the to to Kissinger that the had its about with the Democratic and its and told Kissinger that can at that of not and to the of to It would not surprise to know that may have been the as the Soviets and in fact may have even this to Henry Kissinger a of who and was by the importance of American domestic politics over the he was in an Kissinger had the and of the who the of at and a to their domestic He who the of his will in a domestic his who his policy to the of his will to But such about may not have for the of partisan politics, In Kissinger was in his to American domestic politics, in and in his to the politics of his position. he as a future the 1968 he sought out the and a way to his on both of the political over Vietnam.

Nixon's he the and the foreign policy in Nixon's and, not as their and in the Nixon's of could that Kissinger had not domestic in the policy he for by the of the tape we to that was not in Kissinger's which were of also were a in Nixon's in Kissinger's to in with Nixon's from Kissinger publicly that was American foreign but in fact he was to some of his the in the this as has out in his work on Kissinger and the this was also a Kissinger's about his of the political to the domestic politics of the of Soviet Kissinger the of domestic politics after the of and the of congressional power they in shortly after the collapse of to be of his election Kissinger told the president that election is one of the and that was and Democrat from on down would be a the year and a Kissinger the political in the of his his a for of relations with Kissinger told them just won't do it that … for political it's just for the to for If one thing that will a conservative to became an his that could Vietnam in the Kissinger told the president he that this was the could and that he would out the and that you Now, Kissinger's to not to with very was almost about as August Kissinger for both a and an to in to electoral after the and as put it that we have of that we can just do what is The of Henry Kissinger's to the or the of domestic politics, comes in the record of his for his foreign policy debate with in October Kissinger on all of the the president Kissinger became he to the an about which he had been But in to on it, Kissinger told the the Soviets have to not to it now but it us a to which we can In Kissinger about is the who to cut the bring and in This is the way to get us for a Kissinger up. But this The of Kissinger's is that it to an about not being by the Soviet and his political The election may not have on foreign but it played a role in This is a fairly plea to politics, and political to our of American foreign The we are who want to in their they clear between foreign and domestic politics, even if they they are to and its and the which they work are not they are to different and to struggle for the role of partisan electoral politics as and as we it does not our to its and for their with our of some and to take our and and explain and in what their political or their of or a different was at that and could have the for In the of domestic partisan politics, will also to a variety of is two years in the of a president prone to electoral types of and politics, with like the some more than have some way to the extent or of and not its on domestic politics not be as an one of the more important and our the and of the of American foreign I would that one of the importance of domestic partisan politics in the of American foreign policy is the for a more and of the way foreign their American and to that process, as well as the they have of it. in The has done more than its of that in its but to American politics and recognized that. And perhaps our domestic political will lead to in domestic political and I would that the of electoral politics not be as a or in the making of American foreign policy.

It can as as different and in as and George have told have that like an to the or that domestic politics the type of that has to and are as as if were more less and more of about foreign In fact I would that a of history that in the is of being not by but also by not by but also by and of as well as and the of its The and its on who want to in power may have been a in but it has also of that make no and that of their from who In recognizing the of electoral politics in the history of foreign one a and with the of and and and that make up the American