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Funds and Index Funds — The Ship That Sails With the Fleet, the Ship That Tries to Outrun It, and the Fare Paid Every Year

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Funds and Index Funds — The Ship That Sails With the Fleet, the Ship That Tries to Outrun It, and the Fare Paid Every Year

A fund is a share of a pooled basket, so it promises no principal, and its fees are taken in good years and bad. How index-tracking and stock-picking funds fared differed by country and period.

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Funds and Index Funds — The Ship That Sails With the Fleet, the Ship That Tries to Outrun It, and the Fare Paid Every Year

The Names You Saw in Your Banking App

An office worker opens their banking app during lunchtime. Below their regular savings account, unfamiliar product names line up. The names attach words they have heard on the news, like "KOSPI 200," and next to them, the past year's return and a small percentage with a decimal point are written.

What you end up buying when you put money into this, who that small percentage goes to, and whether last year's returns will continue into this year are not written on the screen.

This article follows those questions by comparing them to a fleet of ships on the sea. Several people pool their boat fares to board a ship, and that ship either travels alongside a large fleet or tries to outpace the fleet. The examples in this article are drawn from products commonly seen by Korean readers, while the concepts apply in any country.

A Ship Ridden by Many People Together

It is not easy to collect small shares in dozens of companies with 10 million won. You have to buy from each company separately, and some companies have large share prices. If thousands of people with the same concern pool their money together, the situation changes.

A fund is a product where many people pool their money together, distribute it across assets like stocks or bonds, and divide the resulting profits and losses according to their respective shares. Korean law calls this method collective investment. When you collect money and buy it as a bundle, you can share a wide bundle at a low cost that would be hard to buy alone (OpenStax Principles Finance 2e 1.5). What the investor receives is a share of ownership in that entire bundle (OpenStax Principles Finance 2e 12.1).

A ship has someone who steers it and a place that sells tickets. An asset management company is a company that decides where and how much of the money gathered in a fund to put in, and operates it. In terms of a ship, they are the captain and crew. A sales company is a company that sells funds to investors and manages those accounts. In Korea, banks and securities firms take on this role (KCI ART001334971).

Net asset value is the value left after subtracting debts from the value of what the fund holds, divided by the number of shares the fund is divided into. For instance, if the combined value of the stocks and cash held by a fund is 1 billion won, there is no debt, and the fund is divided into 1 million shares, the net asset value of a single share is 1,000 won. An investor who withdraws money gets their share back according to this value (DOI: 10.67929/ecgi-law-414-2018).

Therefore, the value of a share rises and falls following the value of what the fund contains. If the stocks contained within drop, the value of the share drops as well. There is no promise that the money entrusted to a fund will remain as it is. How distributing money across multiple assets changes risk is explained in another part of this series, "Risk and Diversification — The Mother Who Counted Her Umbrella Seller and Straw-Shoe Seller Together", while what bonds a fund holds are explained in "Bonds — Why Does a Bundle of Dated Vouchers Rise and Fall in Price?".

The Yearly Fare

A ship does not go for free. You pay the captain and crew, the ticket seller, and the keeper who holds your luggage.

The total expense ratio is the percentage of the fund's assets deducted every year and paid to the companies running the fund, such as the asset manager and the sales company. The expenses of Korean equity funds can be divided into the management fee for running the assets, the sales fee for selling them, and the custody fee for keeping the assets safe (DOI: 10.22903/jbr.2014.29.4.289). The small percentage on the front screen is this total expense ratio. Besides the total expense ratio, there may be separate costs that apply, such as a commission taken once when you buy (DOI: 10.1108/s1569-375920160000097006).

The total expense ratio is not deducted from earnings, but is calculated by multiplying the entire fund assets by a percentage. Therefore, it is taken out in years when the fund makes money and in years when it loses. For example, if the fund's assets fluctuate and shrink between 10 million won and 9 million won over the course of the year, the money withdrawn that year at a total expense ratio of 1.5% per year is roughly between 135,000 won and 150,000 won. Because the fee is charged by multiplying the size of the assets over that time by the percentage, the exact amount depends on when and how much the assets shrank.

Over a long period of time, that share grows large. For example, suppose there are two funds holding the same assets that earn 5% a year before fees are deducted, with one having a total expense ratio of 0.2% per year and the other 1.5% per year. To make the math easy, let us say that after deducting fees, 4.8% and 3.5% remain each year. If you leave 10 million won for 20 years, the first becomes about 25.54 million won, and the second becomes about 19.9 million won. You took the same ship, but the difference in fare alone creates a gap of about 5.64 million won after 20 years. The principle by which this difference snowballs over the years is covered in another part of this series, "Compound Interest — A Snowball That Grows as It Rolls, and the Share That Melts Along the Way".

In actual Korean funds as well, fees left a mark on the results. Across all three types—general equity, small-and-mid cap/dividend/theme, and index funds—funds with high fees had the lowest actual returns after fees were deducted (DOI: 10.22903/jbr.2014.29.4.289). Among the fees, funds with high sales fees had markedly lower returns, and before the sales fees were deducted, performance was statistically the same regardless of the sales fee level. Management fees tended to move in the same direction as returns, but not clearly (KCI ART001945812). There are also findings that funds with high sales fees did not manage things any better (KCI ART001334971).

However, the cheapest management fee side was not always the best performer either. In general equity and small-and-mid cap/dividend/theme funds, the performance of the group with the lowest management fees dropped noticeably, and researchers inferred the reason to be neglectful management by the asset management company or fund manager (DOI: 10.22903/jbr.2014.29.4.289). That does not mean funds with high management fees clearly performed better either (KCI ART001945812). The fare is a large share of the outcome, but it is not the entirety of the outcome.

The Position of the Fleet in a Single Number

Morning news reports that "the KOSPI rose" or "the KOSPI fell." Even though the share prices of hundreds of companies all moved differently, the news speaks in a single number.

A stock market index is an indicator that bundles the share prices of several designated companies together and expresses them in comparison to their value at a reference point in time. The KOSPI bundles companies listed on the Korea Exchange, the KOSPI 200 bundles 200 of them, and the S&P 500 bundles 500 large companies in the United States. Metaphorically speaking, it is a single dot marking roughly where the entire fleet of ships is right now. A benchmark is an index used as a yardstick to compare a fund's performance. If you invest in Korean stocks, you commonly use the KOSPI or KOSPI 200 as your benchmark.

An index fund is a fund that holds the stocks making up a stock market index in roughly the same proportions as the index, aiming to follow the index's movements as they are. It is a boat moving along with the herd right in the middle of the fleet. If the herd encounters a storm, that boat encounters it too. When the index falls, the fund following the index falls right along with it.

The analogy holds up to this point. Real fleets move forward, but stock market indices have sometimes drifted backward for years at a time. Also, unlike a ship's destination, nobody knows in advance where an index will end up.

Even when following the same index, the results were not the same. Tracking error is the degree to which a fund's return diverges from the return of the index it attempts to follow. For South Korean KOSPI 200 index funds, the difference in the 12-month returns measured at year-end between the best-performing fund and the worst-performing fund ranged from 3 percentage points to 13 percentage points depending on the year (KCI ART002175035, July 2004–June 2014). In the same study, index funds as a whole clearly earned more than the index before fees were deducted, but after fees were deducted that difference was not clear, and in the latter half of the sample, outperformance shrank significantly and became unclear. Funds with high fees failed to earn more even before fees were deducted and ultimately fell behind the index. The portion exceeding the index was related to trading using derivatives such as futures and options, and had no relation to how different the held stocks were from the index.

In a study looking at Korean index funds from an earlier period, 2001–2007, funds with low costs and small tracking errors had higher annualized returns. This study reported that Korean index funds did not just stop at blindly copying the index (KCI ART001339319). Even with the same name of index fund, just how far that boat drifts from the herd varies from fund to fund.

A Ship Where Passengers Can Buy and Sell Seats Even While Underway

Ordinary funds buy and sell their shares at a net asset value determined once a day. There are also funds that trade like stocks, with prices changing while the market is open.

An exchange-traded fund (ETF) is a fund that is listed on an exchange and can be bought and sold while the market is open, just like a stock, and typically tracks a set index. Buying and selling a single ETF is like buying and selling the many stocks inside it all at once (OpenStax Principles Finance 2e 12.1). Its cited advantages include the ability to buy and sell easily, relatively low costs, and clear transparency regarding what it holds (DOI: 10.1257/jep.32.1.135). Metaphorically, it is a ship where passengers can buy and sell their seats among themselves even while the voyage is underway.

The price of a seat can diverge from the value of the cargo loaded on the ship. Because ETFs are priced separately on the exchange, their prices can drift away from their net asset value. In Korean ETFs, this gap was wider when the expense ratio was higher, when the price fluctuated more wildly within a day, and when individual investors accounted for a larger share of trading with lower overall trading volume. Trading opportunities capitalizing on this gap did not vanish within the same day and were instead resolved only the next day (KCI ART001644811, 35 ETFs from 2002 to 2009).

What the fund tracks also shapes the outcome. Early ETFs tracked broad market indexes and provided diversification at a low cost, but among later products, an increasing number tracked narrow themes and charged high fees. In one study, these thematic ETFs lost about 30% on a risk-adjusted basis over their first five years after listing. This could not be explained by fees or the demand to avoid risk, but was caused by the fact that the stocks held by the ETF had already become expensive around the time of listing. The researchers interpreted this result as aligning with the trend of launching products tailored to themes that catch people's eyes (DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhac048).

A Boat Trying to Get Ahead of the Pack

Next to index funds, there are other funds with names like "equity" or "growth." Instead of following an index, the managers of these funds pick individual stocks themselves.

An active fund is a fund where the manager picks stocks directly to try and achieve a higher return than the benchmark. A passive fund is a fund that does not pick stocks and instead follows a set index, which includes index funds and most ETFs. Metaphorically, an active fund is a boat that chooses a separate waterway to get ahead of the pack, and its fare is usually more expensive (DOI: 10.1108/s1569-375920160000097006).

Which side went farther depended on where and when you measured it. In a book chapter study comparing 776 U.S. and European equity funds from 2004 to 2014, the risk-adjusted performance before fees was similar between active and index funds. The heavier costs on the active side, especially the upfront sales commissions, appeared to wipe out the portion that beat the index. The authors concluded that fees and transaction costs appeared to shape the results more than past returns (DOI: 10.1108/s1569-375920160000097006).

There are also results pointing the other way. A study looking at 506 funds across five major European fund countries found that risk-adjusted excess returns remained positive even after deducting costs, particularly for funds investing in smaller companies. The researchers noted that this result differed from most U.S. studies (DOI: 10.1111/1468-036x.00177). In Korea as well, 684 active funds from January 2002 to June 2008 generated a clear risk-adjusted monthly average excess return of 0.20%, and the performance differences among funds mainly stemmed from stock-picking ability (KCI ART001618472).

A study examining the same Korean funds with a different sample and methodology paints a different picture. General equity funds showed lower actual returns after deducting fees compared to index funds, because they failed to beat the market return while carrying higher fees (DOI: 10.22903/jbr.2014.29.4.289). In another study, Korean active funds as a whole did not hold more cheap stocks than the index, and this was related to why their performance was not outstanding, though some funds consistently held more cheap stocks and achieved relatively good performance (DOI: 10.26845/KJFS.2020.02.49.1.41).

There are also theoretical models explaining why, even if a manager has skill, it remains difficult on average to beat the index. Money flocks to skilled management companies, and as funds grow larger, beating the index becomes harder, keeping active funds from outperforming passive ones on average. Still, when fitting this model to data, the vast majority of active managers—about 80%—turned out to have enough skill to earn back at least their fees. In this model, past performance could not predict future returns, but that did not mean there were no differences in skill among managers (DOI: 10.1086/424739). The records of active and passive funds differed depending on the country and period, and whether performance was measured before or after fees.

Some argue, to varying degrees, that if market prices already reflect information, hunting for cheap stocks is pointless (OpenStax Principles Finance 2e 11.5). The debate over whether you can beat the market itself is explored in "Can You Beat the Market? — The Cracks in the Efficient Market Hypothesis".

Will the Boat That Was Ahead Last Year Stay Ahead This Year?

Fund advertisements often feature phrases like "Number 1 in return last year." If the boat that was ahead last year stays ahead this year, that phrase becomes useful information.

Performance persistence is the tendency of funds that perform well in one period to perform well in the next period. This tendency has appeared differently across countries, time periods, and measurement methods. In a study that collected equity funds year by year without omission from 1971 to 1991, there was quite a bit of persistence in the 1970s, but fund returns did not carry over in the 1980s (DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1995.tb04795.x). In another study using U.S. fund data that included even funds that had closed down without omission, almost all of the persistence was explained by the common characteristics and costs of the stocks held by the funds, and what remained unexplained was simply that the worst-performing funds continued to lag far behind. The researcher concluded that this result does not support the idea that there are skilled fund managers (DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb03808.x; U.S. sample DOI: 10.1093/rfs/15.5.1439).

When measured over short periods, persistence sometimes appears. In a study that ranked funds by quarter, top 10% funds generated an excess return of 0.39 percentage points in the following quarter, but it disappeared when measured over longer periods (DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhi007). Among 200 Taiwanese domestic equity funds (1996–2009), a tendency appeared where funds that performed well in the previous year performed well in the following year as well, and funds that did poorly continued to do poorly (DOI: 10.1108/03074351211248207). Strong persistence in average returns also appeared in European funds investing in the UK (DOI: 10.1111/1468-036x.00177). Regarding U.S. funds as well, a study that examined methods of measuring persistence through simulations noted that it supports earlier findings that U.S. fund performance actually possesses persistence (DOI: 10.1016/s0304-405x(99)00040-9).

There is one thing that blurs this picture. Survivorship bias is the phenomenon where funds that perform poorly and close down or merge into other funds drop out of the data, making the average of the remaining funds look better than it actually is. If sunken ships are erased from port records, the remaining records alone make the sea look calmer than it actually is. In U.S. fund data, this bias was 0.07% per year in a 1-year sample, but grew to 1% per year in samples exceeding 15 years, and when looking only at surviving funds, the evidence for persistence also weakened (DOI: 10.1093/rfs/15.5.1439). In the earlier 1971–1991 study as well, survivorship bias was larger than the estimates of previous studies (DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1995.tb04795.x).

Past returns do not promise future returns. There are findings showing that past return numbers alone made it difficult to pick funds that would pull ahead in the future. In the same study, persistence was observed only in bond funds, and even that advantage did not overcome the average inferiority caused by fees (DOI: 10.2469/faj.v51.n6.1948).

The Distance the Ship Traveled and the Distance the Passengers Traveled

Let us say, for example, that a fund went up by 20% in its first year and dropped by 10% in the second year. The fund itself gained 8% over the two years. If a person who put 1 million won into this fund at the beginning of the first year saw it become 1.2 million won and then added 9 million won more at the beginning of the second year, that 10.2 million won would decrease by 10% in the following year, leaving 9180000 won. Having put in a total of 10 million won and walking away with 9180000 won, the fund went up by 8%, but this person lost 820000 won.

Investor return reflects the timing and amounts of putting money in and taking it out of a fund, and is the actual return earned by the people who put money into that fund. The return a fund discloses is the result when it is held unchanged from start to finish, so it can differ from the result of someone who put money in and took it out in the middle. The ship reached its destination, but passengers who boarded when the weather was good and got off when a storm hit traveled less distance than the ship.

In a study that measured the difference between these two returns across 200 domestic equity funds in Taiwan (1996–2009), the better a fund's performance, the worse the performance was at the times investors put money in and took it out. The larger and older the fund, the worse this timing performance was, whereas in funds managed mainly around cheap stocks, it was actually better. The researchers interpreted that investors chase the returns of well-performing funds while trying to avoid losses (DOI: 10.1108/03074351211248207). Studies directly measuring this difference among Korean fund investors were not present in the materials gathered here.

Even among people who bought and sold stocks directly rather than funds, there are findings—though the pattern looks different—that the act of buying and selling shaved down returns. Among 66,465 households that were clients of an American discount brokerage (1991–1996), the households that traded most frequently earned 11.4% per year, falling well short of the market's 17.9% over the same period, while the average household made 16.4%. The researchers saw that overconfidence could explain the frequent trading and low performance (DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00226). In the Korean KOSPI market from 1999 to 2023, individual investors showed a tendency to net-sell when good news came out, and researchers interpreted this tendency as a cause of individuals' low returns (DOI: 10.37727/jkdas.2024.26.5.1443).

The direction of the difference is not always fixed toward a loss. If someone put in a large amount right before prices rose, the investor return becomes higher than the fund return. One of the reasons people get different results even while holding the same fund is the timing of when they put money in and took it out.

Back in Front of the App Screen

Let us return to the screen from lunchtime. The "KOSPI 200" attached to the fund name is the name of the fleet this ship is trying to follow, which is a stock market index. If the word "Index" is attached, it means it is a fund that aims to follow the index, and if the index falls, this fund falls with it. Even among funds following the same index, such as South Korea's KOSPI 200 index funds, annual returns have diverged by as much as 13 percentage points in some cases.

The small number with a decimal point is the total expense ratio. This ratio is deducted from the fund's assets whether the year was profitable or losing, and as in the previous example, it can leave a difference of millions of won on the same 10 million won over 20 years. Even so, the group with the cheapest management fees among general South Korean equity funds was not the one that performed the best.

The return over the past year is the distance that ship traveled over the past year. Whether that distance will continue this year varies by country and period, and when sunken ships are dropped from the records, the distance traveled by the remaining ships looks longer than it actually is. If this fund is an ETF, the price at which it is bought and sold on the exchange and its net asset value may temporarily diverge.

There is also one number not on the screen. It is your own investor return, which varies depending on when you board that ship and when you get off.

Where to Look Next

The debate over whether you can pick stocks and beat the market is covered in "Can You Beat the Market? — The Cracks in the Efficient Market Hypothesis". What a single share of stock in a fund actually means that you own begins in "What You Actually Own When You Own a Share — And Where You Stand in Line". The moments when the market shakes all at once are followed by "Why Financial Crises Keep Coming Back — Fat Tails, Black Swans, and Systemic Risk".

Other parts of this series also connect with this article. "Compound Interest — A Snowball That Grows as It Rolls, and the Share That Melts Along the Way" explains how fees and returns compound year after year, "Risk and Diversification — The Mother Who Counted Her Umbrella Seller and Straw-Shoe Seller Together" explains how spreading investments across multiple assets changes risk, and "Bonds — Why Does a Bundle of Dated Vouchers Rise and Fall in Price?" breaks down bonds, another asset held by funds.


Source Papers

  • "Principles of Finance 2e — 1.5 Markets and Participants" (2026) — OpenStax Principles Finance 2e 1.5 — An investment company is a financial intermediary that pools money from multiple investors to buy and manage bundles of stocks and bonds cheaply.
  • "Principles of Finance 2e — 12.1 Overview of US Financial Markets" (2026) — OpenStax Principles Finance 2e 12.1 — Investment companies buy and assemble securities and then sell ownership shares to investors, and ETFs are bundles of securities traded on an exchange just like stocks, allowing a broad bundle to be bought and sold in a single transaction.
  • "Principles of Finance 2e — 11.5 Efficient Markets" (2026) — OpenStax Principles Finance 2e 11.5 — Those who believe in the efficient market hypothesis consider finding undervalued stocks or predicting trends to be useless, though they differ in degree.
  • "펀드 판매사의 역할과 판매 보수의 적정성:한국의 주식형 펀드를 대상으로" (2009) — KCI ART001334971 — In Korean equity funds, those with higher sales loads did not show better performance and instead lowered it, and it was not confirmed that banks and securities firms raised performance as sellers.
  • "The New Titans of Wall Street: A Theoretical Framework for Passive Investors" (2018) — DOI: 10.67929/ecgi-law-414-2018 — Theoretical framework for passive investors (ETFs and index funds): Fund investors can sell their shares and receive net asset value at any time, so asset managers compete on price and performance.
  • "주식형 펀드 보수와 성과: 펀드 유형별 비교" (2014) — DOI: 10.22903/jbr.2014.29.4.289 — When dividing Korean equity fund fees into management, sales, and custody, general equity funds had lower actual returns than index funds, funds with high fees in all types had the lowest actual returns, and the management-fee bottom group also had significantly lower performance (inferred as poor management).
  • "운용 및 판매 보수와 주식형 펀드의 성과" (2014) — KCI ART001945812 — In Korean equity funds, management fees tended to have a positive relationship with returns but were not significant, sales fees had a significant negative impact, and before deducting sales fees, performance was identical regardless of the fee level.
  • "KOSPI200 인덱스펀드의 성과특성에 관한 연구" (2016) — KCI ART002175035 — From July 2004 to June 2014, the difference between the maximum and minimum 12-month returns of Korean KOSPI200 index funds was 3% to 13%, gross return outperformance was significant but net return outperformance was not, funds with high fees produced a significant negative net outperformance, and the source of outperformance appears to be quantitative arbitrage using derivatives.
  • "펀드보수와 추적오차가 인덱스펀드의 성과에 미치는 영향" (2009) — KCI ART001339319 — From 2001 to 2007, Korean index funds had the best performance among equity fund types, did not merely replicate indexes, and funds with low costs and small tracking errors had higher annual average returns.
  • "Exchange-Traded Funds 101 for Economists" (2018) — DOI: 10.1257/jep.32.1.135 — ETFs generally track specific indexes and have potential advantages of liquidity, low cost, tax efficiency, and transparency (tax efficiency is not used in this episode).
  • "한국 상장지수펀드(ETF)의 가격효율성" (2012) — KCI ART001644811 — Across 35 Korean ETFs from 2002 to 2009, tracking error grew larger with distributions, index volatility, and changes in constituent stocks and was unrelated to management skill, pricing errors were larger when the expense ratio, intraday volatility, and individual trading share were higher and liquidity was lower, and arbitrage opportunities were resolved only the next day.
  • "Competition for Attention in the ETF Space" (2022) — DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhac048 — Niche ETFs tracking narrow themes lost about 30% risk-adjusted in their first 5 years, which was due to the overvaluation of underlying stocks at the time of listing rather than fees or hedging demand, matching the behavior of suppliers launching products tailored to attention-grabbing themes.
  • "Returns from Investing in Equity Mutual Funds 1971 to 1991" (1995) — DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1995.tb04795.x — All equity mutual funds that existed each year from 1971 to 1991 (no country specified in the abstract) fell short of the benchmark both after and before fee deductions as a whole, survivorship bias was larger than previous estimates, and the persistence of the 1970s vanished in the 1980s.
  • "Active versus Passive Investing: An Empirical Study on The US and European Mutual Funds and ETFs" (2016) — DOI: 10.1108/s1569-375920160000097006 — From a book chapter on 776 U.S. and European equity funds from 2004 to 2014: pre-fee risk-adjusted performance was similar between active and index replication, active's heavy costs (mainly front-end loads) seemed to erase excess performance, performance could be even lower if sellers extracted further fees outside the total expense ratio, and the authors concluded that attention should be paid to fees and trading costs rather than past returns (prescriptive recommendations are not carried into the main text).
  • "European Mutual Fund Performance" (2002) — DOI: 10.1111/1468-036x.00177 — 506 funds across 5 European countries showed positive alphas even after cost deductions (especially small-cap funds), significant outperformance in 4 out of 5 countries when adding back fees, and strong persistence in funds investing in the UK, a result differing from most U.S. studies.
  • "액티브펀드의 성과와 종목선택능력에 대한 연구" (2011) — KCI ART001618472 — From January 2002 to June 2008, 684 Korean active funds achieved a significant monthly risk-adjusted return of 0.20%, and performance differences mainly stemmed from stock-picking ability.
  • "액티브펀드의 성과와 주식시장의 이상현상" (2020) — DOI: 10.26845/KJFS.2020.02.49.1.41 — Korean active funds as a whole did not hold undervalued stocks compared to the benchmark and thus failed to achieve superior performance, but some consistently held undervalued stocks and performed relatively well.
  • "Mutual Fund Flows and Performance in Rational Markets" (2004) — DOI: 10.1086/424739 — Theoretical model: because of capital supply competition and diminishing returns to scale, active management does not beat passive management and past performance cannot predict the future, but fitted to the data, about 80% of active managers possess the skill to earn at least their fees.
  • "On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance" (1997) — DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb03808.x — In a sample free of survivorship bias, common factors in stock returns and costs explained almost all fund performance persistence, unexplained persistence was concentrated in the strong underperformance of the worst funds, and this does not support the existence of skilled managers.
  • "Short-Term Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance" (2004) — DOI: 10.1093/rfs/hhi007 — When ranked quarterly, top 10% funds generated an excess return of 39 basis points in the next quarter, but this vanished when evaluated over longer horizons, showing superior performance is a short-lived phenomenon.
  • "Return persistence and investment timing decisions in Taiwanese domestic equity mutual funds" (2012) — DOI: 10.1108/03074351211248207 — Across 200 Taiwanese domestic equity funds from 1996 to 2009, prior-year performance carried over into the following year, investor timing performance measured by the difference between money-weighted and geometric mean returns had a negative relationship with fund performance, and the authors interpreted this as loss aversion and return chasing.
  • "Mutual Fund Survivorship" (2002) — DOI: 10.1093/rfs/15.5.1439 — In U.S. fund data, survivorship bias in average performance grew from 0.07% per year in a 1-year sample to 1% per year in samples exceeding 15 years, and survival conditions weaken evidence of performance persistence.
  • "Survivorship bias and attrition effects in measures of performance persistence" (1999) — DOI: 10.1016/s0304-405x(99)00040-9 — Simulation: when survival depends on multi-period performance, survivorship bias creates spurious reversals, methodological biases in U.S. fund data also affect persistence measurement, and the results support earlier findings that U.S. fund performance is indeed persistent.
  • "Does Historical Performance Predict Future Performance?" (1995) — DOI: 10.2469/faj.v51.n6.1948 — Historical performance figures alone made it difficult to pick future winners, persistence was observed only in bond funds, and even that advantage did not overcome the average handicap caused by fees.
  • "Trading Is Hazardous to Your Wealth: The Common Stock Investment Performance of Individual Investors" (2000) — DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00226 — Among 66,465 households at a U.S. discount brokerage from 1991 to 1996, the households that traded the most lagged the market (17.9%) with an 11.4% return (compared to 16.4% for the average household), and overconfidence can explain the frequent trading and poor performance.
  • "주식시장 수익률과 개인 투자자의 매매 성향" (2024) — DOI: 10.37727/jkdas.2024.26.5.1443 — On the Korean KOSPI from 1999 to 2023, greater individual net buying was associated with lower returns, individuals showed a tendency to net sell on positive news, and the authors interpreted this as the source of individual profitability disadvantage.
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📚 Investing from Scratch — Learning to Read Interest, Bonds, Risk and Funds
4 / 4
  1. 1.Compound Interest — A Snowball That Grows as It Rolls, and the Share That Melts Along the Way
  2. 2.Bonds — Why Does a Bundle of Dated Vouchers Rise and Fall in Price?
  3. 3.Risk and Diversification — The Mother Who Counted Her Umbrella Seller and Straw-Shoe Seller Together
  4. 4.Funds and Index Funds — The Ship That Sails With the Fleet, the Ship That Tries to Outrun It, and the Fare Paid Every Year
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